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Artificial Life is concerned with understanding the dynamics of human societies. A
defining feature of any society is its institutions. However, defining exactly what an
institution is has proven difficult, with authors often talking past each other. This
paper presents a dynamic model of institutions, which views institutions as political
game forms that generate the rules of a group’s economic interactions. Unlike most
prior work, the framework presented here allows for the construction of explicit models
of the evolution of institutional rules. It takes account of the fact that group members
are likely to try to create rules that benefit themselves. Following from this, it allows
us to determine the conditions under which self-interested individuals will create insti-
tutional rules that support cooperation, e.g. that prevent a Tragedy of the Commons.
The paper finishes with an example of how a model of the evolution of institutional
rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation can be created. It is intended that
this framework will allow Artificial Life researchers to examine how human groups can
themselves create conditions for cooperation. This will help provide a better under-
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2standing of historical human social evolution, and facilitate the resolution of pressing
societal social dilemmas.
Keywords: cooperation; institutions; human evolution; exchange; evolutionary economics;
tragedy of the commons
Introduction
Artificial Life is concerned with the simulation and synthesis of living systems. One key type
of living system that Artificial Life seeks to understand through simulation and synthesis
is human social organization. The goals behind this are many and varied, from wanting to
better understand the ecological and social pressures that historically transformed human
groups from egalitarian hunter-gatherers to hierarchical chiefdoms and states, to being able
to devise incentive schemes to prevent climate change, to being able to engineer artificial
systems that autonomously adapt their social organization to changing conditions. All
of these efforts lie at the interface with a number of other disciplines that are concerned
with understanding human social organization, including anthropology, archeology, artificial
intelligence, economics, evolutionary biology, primatology, political science, and psychology.
This paper reviews the different approaches that have been used to model the cultural
evolution of human societies, before going on to argue for the merits of an institutional
approach. Following Hurwicz [34], institutions are defined here as political game forms
that generate the rules of a group’s economic interactions. This is in contrast to other
work that has tended to define institutions either as equilibrium economic behavior within
a society (e.g. 61), or directly as the rules of the economic interactions themselves (e.g.
44). The problem with these approaches is that they do not allow us to model how the
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that rules will typically result from processes of bargaining and negotiation between self-
interested group members who may have different bargaining strengths [65, 66]. But by
viewing institutions as the political game forms that generate these rules, we can develop
dynamic models of how institutions and hence the economic interactions of societies change
over time, allowing us to better address the goals of Artificial Life researchers.
Two big questions about human societies
When we look at human societies, two big features stand out as being is in particular need
of explanation. The first is the high level of cooperation and coordination between unrelated
individuals. Compared to other primates, humans are unique in depending upon exchange
with other individuals for nearly all of their vital resources. For example, very few human
individuals produce by themselves all of the food, shelter, clothing, etc. that they need
to survive. Rather, individuals specialize in one occupation, and obtain their other vital
resources through exchange with others. In economics, this high degree of interdependency
is known as catallaxy [45, 55]. By contrast other primates are much less interdependent, and
produce nearly all of their vital resources themselves, with only limited exchange of food
even between parents and offspring in most species [35].
Strikingly, the degree of interdependence among humans has increased over time from
the first hunter-gatherers through to modern day states. For hundreds of thousands of
years, humans lived as hunter-gatherers, obtaining resources by hunting large animals and
gathering plant materials [40]. Ancient hunter-gatherer groups practiced extensive food
sharing between camp members, and there was a marked division of labor between males
who hunted large animals, providing protein, and females who gathered plants, providing
4carbohydrates [41]. With the Neolithic origin of agriculture that began circa 10,000 years
ago, division of labor further increased, with some individuals specializing entirely in tasks
unrelated to food production, such as producing crafts [46]. Where we see such high levels
of specialization elsewhere in the biological world, it is only in cases where there is a very
high genetic relatedness between group members, as exemplified by eusocial insect colonies
[42]. In such cases, the division of labor is coordinated by means of a common genetic
program carried by each individual. But in human societies, division of labor and exchange
occurs between unrelated individuals that may never meet again, what Seabright [64] calls
“a company of strangers”.
Crucially, exchange is always sequential: one individual has to part with their goods first
[25]. This creates all kinds of opportunities for one party to cheat on an exchange. This ever
present threat of cheating is what Greif [25, 26] calls the “fundamental problem of exchange”.
Further, there are asymmetries in the information held by the parties to an exchange. For
example, the producer of a good knows far more about its quality than the receiver [44].
Think of a used car sales person, for example. These issues are glossed over in Neoclassical
economics, which assumes that exchange is simultaneous and with perfect information and
hence assumes away the fundamental problem of exchange. In reality, however, individuals
must have had to find a way to overcome these problems repeatedly throughout the evolution
of human societies.
The fact that interactions in modern societies are between unrelated individuals who may
never meet again is problematic for traditional evolutionary explanations for cooperation
based upon kinship and dyadic reciprocity. Some researchers have taken this to be evidence
that in contrast to other species, selection in humans must primarily operate between whole
groups or societies, with more cooperative societies outcompeting less cooperate societies
5[60, 70]. However, this kind of group selection explanation requires that competition between
individuals within a group is suppressed, for example through biased social learning, in which
individuals are assumed to simply copy common behaviors in their group without regard to
the economic consequences of doing the behavior [32, 62, 9]. By contrast, this paper will
show how modeling the creation of institutional rules through political games allows the
interactions that make up modern societies to be explained in terms of the self-interested
actor model that underlies economics and evolutionary biology.
The second key feature of human societies is their transition between egalitarian and hi-
erarchical modes of social organization. Both anthropological [5] and archeological evidence
[56] implies that the first human social groups were egalitarian hunter-gatherers. Anthropo-
logical studies of modern hunter-gatherer groups show that decisions are invariably reached
by a group consensus being formed, with each individual being allowed to voice its opinion
in a group-wide discussion [5]. While such groups do have leaders, the role of leaders is
not to coerce others or monopolize the discussion, but rather to facilitate turn-taking and
help the group reach a consensus. Archeological evidence of burial sites similarly reveals no
status differentiation when individuals were buried [56].
By contrast, the transition to agriculture was accompanied by a shift to hierarchical
social organization, with a small number of individuals exhibiting high status. Evidence
from burial sites shows that leaders started to be buried with valuable grave goods such as
obsidian, and were not buried alongside other group members as had occurred previously
[56]. Hierarchy was manifested both in resource inequality, and in inequality in decision
making, with leaders at the top of the hierarchy coercing the rest of the group to follow
their decisions. The archeological evidence points to the first hierarchical societies being
chiefdoms, with a single level of hierarchy, i.e. a chief presiding over commoners [18]. The
6origin of states around 4000 years ago is defined in terms of a shift to multiple levels of
hierarchy, with rulers creating specialized administrative positions between themselves and
the commoners [67]. This represents a new form of division of labor and specialization,
where some individuals specialize in administering the group.
What we see in human evolution, then, is a gradual increase both in hierarchical or-
ganization, and in the degree of division of labor and specialization. These co-occur with
an increase in group size. Hunter-gatherer bands would have numbered no more than the
hundreds. Cemetery evidence shows that the origin of agriculture brought about a massive
increase in fertility [4], with evidence suggesting that the carrying capacity of agricultural-
ists with irrigation may have been up to 250 times larger than that of hunter-gatherers [30].
This is supported by evidence that the first cities arose during this period. Finally, in states
economic interactions occur between millions of individuals [64]. What Artificial Life needs
is a dynamic model of how cooperation, hierarchy, and group size co-evolve. In the next
section, I introduce the critical role that institutions play in this.
Institutions
What do economic interactions within groups look like? In modern groups, individuals take
part in a range of interactions, from bilateral exchange through to the production and main-
tenance of goods upon which the whole group depends, such as clean air. These interactions
can be modeled using game theory [23], an approach which has been endorsed across essen-
tially all of science, from economics and evolutionary biology through to computer science
and artificial intelligence. In game theory a social interaction (game) consists of two com-
ponents [34]: the “rules of the game” – more formally, the game form – and the preferences
of the players over the different possible material outcomes. Our focus here is on the rules
7of the game. The rules of a game consist of the possible strategies that an individual can
choose between (e.g. “cooperate” or “defect”), and the mapping between the strategies cho-
sen by each player and the material payoff that each receives, e.g. amount of money, food
or shelter. Some of the rules of a game will follow directly from properties of the physical
world and the current state of technology that the players have, and so cannot be changed.
But crucially, there are aspects of the rules that it is possible for human players themselves
to change [44, 49, 34, 26, 36]. An institution in game theory is defined as a family of rules
(game forms) that individuals can potentially choose between, given the current physical
state of the environment and the state of their technology [34]. The particular rules chosen
are known as the institutional rules. These rules change what the optimal economic behavior
is for individuals that are trying to maximize their own material payoff.
One key type of institutional rules have the effect of promoting cooperation in economic
activities. They do this by providing coordinated systems of rewards and punishments, and
by coordinating the sharing of information about the actions of other individuals. As such,
they make cooperation rather than defection advantageous for self-interested individuals
[26]. For example, Ostrom [49] describes the institutional rules that regulate the use of
irrigation systems in a number of small-scale extant societies. The rules include prescriptions
about when a farmer may take water, and how much they may take. They also include
arrangements such as groups setting up systems in which irrigators take it in turn to monitor
other users to ensure that they are not violating the rules, or hire third party agents to act
as monitors and pay for them using their communal resources. By creating these rules,
groups move the game away from what would otherwise be a Tragedy of the Commons [29]
in water usage, in which self-interested individuals would simply take as much water as they
needed, leaving insufficient levels for other farmers.
8Models in evolutionary biology, and indeed Artificial Life, have rarely considered the
possibility that the individuals playing a game are able to jointly change some of the rules in
this way. A prime example is given by models of sanctioning (e.g. 11, 8, 7, 31). These models
consider one possible game form in which a strategy is for one individual to unilaterally
punish another, at a cost to itself. But these models exclude other possible game forms that
individuals could move to given their current environment and technology, such as allocating
a proportion of their shared resources to pay for some individuals to act as monitors, which
removes the unilateral costs of punishment [49, 2, 27, 52]. In other words, they do not allow
for the possibility of individuals collectively changing the rules and hence the situation they
find themselves in. Yet empirical evidence demonstrates that humans do exactly this across
all scales of society [36, 49, 59].
Institutions and the selection of institutional rules are not an invention of modern society;
they exist even in hunter-gatherer groups. For example, extant hunter-gatherer groups have
rules specifying who may take part in hunting an animal, who gets to keep which part of the
kill, how the food will be shared back at the camp, et cetera [33]. These rules greatly increase
the efficiency of exchange, because they prevent individuals from repeatedly having to engage
in a costly negotiation process about how to share each and every kill. If individuals had to
always negotiate, then the costs of negotiating may more than offset the benefits of sharing
[38]. Furthermore, even in hunter-gatherers there is evidence that these rules are produced
by political processes of bargaining and negotiation between group members. For example,
when the Ache hunter-gatherer society moved from foraging to horticulture, they debated
the benefits of public vs. private ownership of fields, and finally voted to transition from
public to private ownership, thereby changing the rules of their economic game [36].
The origin of agriculture during the Neolithic would similarly have necessitated a change
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from simply having its crops taken by another [6]. Agriculture would also have required rules
to regulate the construction and usage of new collective goods such as irrigation systems
[13]; these kind of rules are seen in extant small-scale farming communities [49]. As a final
example, the explosion of long distance trade in Medieval Europe required new rules to allow
a trader to ascertain the reputation of new trading partners, as in the Law Merchant system
in Europe [43, 26]. By creating these rules that spread reputation over long distances, the
traders moved their situation away from a single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which
self-interested individuals would defect, and into a situation in which cooperation was an
equilibrium. Historical evidence implies that these rules were self-created by coalitions of
traders, rather than being imposed externally by a coercive state [26]. In modern economics,
the institutional rules of a society have been argued to be the main determinant of whether
whole nations succeed or fail [44, 1].
The key point is that institutional rules can be actively shaped by group members [44,
65, 66]. Specifically, we should expect each group member to try to create institutional rules
that will benefit itself and its kin. In extant hunter-gatherer groups, institutional rules are
routinely discussed by all group members around the camp fire [5]. By contrast, with the
rise of agriculture leaders started to dominate the creation of institutional rules, creating
rules that benefitted themselves (e.g. by reinforcing inequality) at the expense of the rest
of the group.
The story of human social evolution, then, is a story about how institutions and institu-
tional rules have changed over time [55]. How have institutional rules been created that allow
for successful trade between individuals who may never meet again? And why did the pro-
cesses that create a group’s institutional rules change from egalitarian in hunter-gatherers,
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to extremely hierarchical in the first states?
A framework for modeling the creation of institutional
rules
Hurwicz [34] provides a general model for the dynamics of institutional rules within a group.
Hurwicz defines an institution as a political game form, which sets the form (rules) for a
subsequent economic game. In the political game form, the individual strategies consist of
messages, and the outcomes consist of the rules of the economic game [59]. The material
payoffs that individuals earn are then determined by playing the economic game according to
these generated rules. For example, the political game may consist of individuals negotiating
over how much each group member should contribute to the public good, and what the
sanctions should be if an individual contributes less than this amount. Material payoffs are
then assigned by playing the public goods game with these rules (Figure 1).
In the presence of an institution then, individuals engage in two stages of social interac-
tions, where the first (political) sets the rules for the second (economic). Different sets of
institutional rules generated in the political game will change the way that self-interested
individuals will behave in the economic game. In other words, the results of the political
game will determine whether cooperation is favored or not.
What might the rules of the political game itself look like? In modeling terms, the
political game could be represented by an aggregation rule, as is common in social choice
theory [17]. An aggregation rule is a function that transforms a collection of individual
preferences into a group decision. Since hunter-gatherer groups are typically of an egalitarian
nature, where the preferences of all group members are taken account of [5], the aggregation
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rule for a hunter-gatherer group might take some average of the preferences of all group
members. By contrast, with the origin of agriculture, and subsequently the first states,
political game forms became much less egalitarian [56, 19]. Through unequal access to
resources, leaders became able to change the rules of the political game so that it was no
longer egalitarian, but instead favored themselves. They could then use the political game
to create economic rules that benefitted themselves at the expense of others. An example of
this are the institutional rules that determine how the surpluses resulting from agriculture
are distributed within groups. In hunter-gatherers, institutional rules meant that food was
shared relatively equally within groups [5]. With the transition to agriculture, however,
despotic leaders created rules of distribution in which most resources went to themselves
and their kin [53]. This altered political game could be modeled by using an aggregation
rule that gives weight to the amount of resource that a group member has.
An important future area of research is to develop more sophisticated models of the
political game that go beyond simple aggregation rules. In reality, political games represent
complex processes of bargaining and negotiation in which forward-looking individuals will try
to realize their interests by persuading others, forming alliances, etc. It is this complicated
process that gives rise to some of the costs of having institutions [49] (more technically,
these costs are examples of what are known as transaction costs in economics, where the
transaction here is political). As such, institutional theorists may draw upon computational
models of both argumentation (e.g. 71) and alliance formation (e.g. 24). In particular, it
is worth considering how belief-desire-intention models of agent behavior could be used to
formalize the political game, by explicitly accounting for individuals that have desires, and
formulate behavior based on their current beliefs about the world and the beliefs of other
agents.
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As we have seen in the case of the Neolithic transition from hunter-gatherers to agricul-
turalists, the rules of political games themselves change over time. How and why is this?
Answering this requires frame shifting up a level. In the general model of Hurwicz, the rules
of the political game are set by a preceding game, which can be thought of as a “constitu-
tional game” [50]. The constitutional game might model, for example, a transition between
egalitarian and hierarchical interactions within groups. Of course, the rules for the consti-
tutional game themselves have to come from somewhere, and they may themselves be set
by another preceding game. However, there will not be an infinite regress of games, because
eventually the rules will be given by unchangeable aspects of the environment, such as the
total amount of resources available to individuals, and the laws of physics [34, 50].
A criticism of the Hurwicz model might be that in reality institutions change very slowly,
and that institutional evolution is highly path dependent. The model presented here can
take account of this, however. In particular, the political game does not have to be played
on the same timescale as the economic game. For example, the economic game may be
played many times over the course of a generation, while the political game may only be
played once every several generations. Further, the political game takes account of path
dependence because it is constrained by rules set by the constitutional game, which will
typically be played even less frequently. In this way the model combines intentional change,
where self-interested actors actively try to create rules to benefit themselves, with historical
contingencies. The balance between the effect of historical contingencies and the effect of
intentional action is an empirical question that can only be determined by examining the
particular institutions in question. Finally, as will be demonstrated below, individuals do
not have to be unreasonably forward-looking to form institutional rules under the Hurwicz
model. Rather, processes of trial-and-error and payoff-biased social learning can lead to the
spread of efficient institutional rules [52].
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Comparison with other approaches to modeling institu-
tions
One approach in the literature has been to view institutions directly as the rules of the
economic interactions themselves (e.g. 44, 49). The problem with this approach is that
it struggles to explain institutional change. Viewing institutions as rules recognizes that
they can be produced by intentional action. In other words, that institutions are the means
by which humans shape economic interactions [44]. However, we also need a model for the
processes that generate these rules. Following Hurwicz [34], it is argued here that the essence
of an institution is a political game form that generates the rules.
The other main approach in the literature is to view institutions as equilibrium patterns
of social behavior within groups (e.g. 68, 61, 60), for example, driving on the right hand
side of the road, or having a taboo against eating certain foods (see e.g. 61). This view
of institutions-as-equilibria is commonly used in models of cultural group selection [62, 60].
The idea here is that different social groups happen to reach different stable equilibria (for
example as modeled in 10), i.e. settle on different institutions. The equilibrium that a group
reaches may be due to the initial frequency of a social behavior when the group is founded,
for example. Groups at an equilibrium where individuals will happen to cooperate might
then outcompete other groups at equilibria where their members cooperate less, leading to
the spread of cooperation promoting institutions. The idea of institutions-as-equilibria is
compatible with the model presented here to the extent that different institutional rules, i.e.
different outcomes of the political game, will lead to different economic game forms with
different equilibria.
However, the Hurwicz model makes very different predictions about the processes by
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which groups move between equilibria in the economic game. In the institutions-as-equilibria
cultural group selection model, institutional change is a result of random drift-like processes
inside groups followed by competition between groups. This is inherently a punctuated
process because variation is only produced and selected at the group level. By contrast, the
model presented here allows institutional rules to change as a result of intentional action
inside groups. Allowing for intentional action in addition to random drift fits well with the
cognitive skills of humans, including language and shared intentionality [69]. It accounts for
the fact that self-interested individuals should be expected to try and craft institutional rules
that benefit themselves in economic interactions. As a result, the model predicts gradual and
step-by-step change as individuals constantly strive to improve their lot by either exploiting
the existing institutional rules, or trying to change the rules to benefit themselves [44]. By
contrast for cultural group selection only catastrophic events that affected the whole group,
such as warfare or a major internal crisis, could lead to institutional change.
In reality, institutional change is likely to reflect some elements of both processes. In-
stitutional rules such as the Law Merchant [43, 26], which regulated anonymous trade in
Medieval Europe in the absence of coercion, clearly reflect elements of intentional design.
Other institutional rules, such as the side of the road that we drive on, are more the result
of stochastic variation. Further, the political game form and the economic game form may
be constrained by past chance events. However, in the case of both dyadic exchange and
public goods production, individuals have been demonstrated to not blindly cooperate, but
to make a calculated choice based on the context [57, 28, 39, 51]. In other words, they
respond to the institutional environment in a calculating way. This in turn implies that
they should be expected to actively shape the institutional environment as far as possible
to meet their own preferences.
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What can the institutional approach offer to our under-
standing of societal challenges?
The problem of cooperation in modern societies manifests itself in two forms. The first is
in exchange of resources between agents, i.e. trade. Trade may be between individuals at
a village market, between firms within a nation, or between nations. The second form of
cooperation is in the provision and usage of collective goods, ranging from the management
of a local inshore fishery, through to a global reduction in carbon emissions to prevent climate
change.
In all of these cases, what determines whether or not a society achieves cooperation is
whether or not its institutional rules provide the right incentives to the agents in that society.
Do the institutional rules move the economic game form away from a single-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma? The agents could be, for example, single individuals, firms, or governments.
As Ostrom [49] notes, policy prescriptions by economists and other social scientists have
traditionally involved externally imposing a solution to a cooperation problem on a society.
For trading, this might involve suggesting that a society copy the market rules of a more
successful society. For collective goods, suggested policies might include either dividing
the good into private shares, or assigning a state body to monitor and enforce rewards and
punishments [49]. But as Ostrom stresses, these imposed mechanisms of institutional change
have repeatedly failed. Essentially, this is because what works well in one local environment
need not necessarily work well in another. This is both because local environments will tend
to differ in ways that affect the economic game form, and because different societies have
different local norms and customs. Transplanting institutional rules into a society in which
they are not compatible with the norms and beliefs held by the agents within that society
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is unlikely to work. Furthermore, norms and beliefs typically change very slowly, hence why
economics tends to explain changes in behavior in terms of changes in relative prices rather
than by changes in individual preferences [44].
This suggests that to make successful policy prescriptions we need a bottom-up under-
standing of how institutional rules change within societies. Traditional models in economics
have focused on equilibrium conditions. But such models, along with cultural group selection
models, are ill suited to capture the dynamics of institutional evolution, because institutions
typically change through many small and gradual changes. And while the Hurwicz frame-
work and similar approaches (e.g. 59) have been proposed in economics, they have not been
instantiated in a fully dynamic form that fits particular empirical scenarios.
This is where Artificial Life, and the related field of agent-based economics, comes in.
At its very core, Artificial Life is concerned with producing the bottom-up generation of
behavior. This is exactly what is needed to understand how agent behavior and institutional
rules co-evolve. To date, a convincing theory of institutional change has been lacking. A
convincing model of institutional change needs to both allow institutional rules to change
as a result of individual agent behavior, and to allow for the fact that individual agents are
not perfectly rational and will have incomplete information about their environment. These
are both traditional strengths of Artificial Life.
Artificial Life researchers are also used to dealing with complex systems in which small
perturbations can sometimes cause large and unexpected shocks. This is quite likely to occur
with institutional evolution, where small changes in the outcome of the political game may
lead to large changes in the economic game form. Again, the toolkit of bottom-up modeling
is well equipped to highlight this.
By using Artificial Life simulation techniques, we can begin to get a handle on the
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effect that changing the institutional rules is likely to have on economic games, and on how
these changes in the economic game form feed back into changed individual preferences
in the political game. We can also start to appreciate the effect of different political and
constitutional game forms on this process. This has previously all lied outside of the scope of
static equilibrium models, which has limited the ability of analysts to foresee the implications
of policy changes.
The next section provides a basic example of how the general Hurwicz model can be
instantiated as a dynamic model of the evolution of institutional rules.
The evolution of institutional rules for rewarding and
sanctioning in a public goods game with an egalitarian
political game form
One well-studied type of social interaction in both the social sciences and evolutionary
biology are collective actions [48]. In these situations each group member must choose
whether or not to cooperate by contributing some of their individual resources to a group
project. This provides a benefit that is shared with the whole group, including the actor.
Because the benefits are shared with the whole group, but only cooperators pay the cost,
we would expect defection to be favored by evolution in the absence of other factors such as
rewards, punishment, reputation, or kin structure.
Examples of collective action problems have occurred throughout human evolution. For
example, hunter-gatherers engage in cooperative hunting, in which several individuals must
work together in order to prevent a prey from escaping. Hunter-gatherers also engage in
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various collective construction projects, such as burning habitat, and building dams to trap
and poison fish [37]. The advent of agriculture brought about further collective action
problems, including the usage of common-pool resources such as irrigation water [12] and
grazing land.
It is well known that collective action problems can be solved if individuals that cooperate
are rewarded, or if individuals that defect are punished [48, 47]. Specifically, cooperation
will be individually advantageous if the reward that cooperators receive is greater than
the cost of cooperating, or if the punishment that defectors receive is greater than the
cost of cooperating [47, 63]. The question is then, where do these rewards or punishments
come from [49]? Cultural evolution models have typically assumed that each individual
unilaterally chooses whether to reward or punish another, at some individual cost (e.g.
11, 8, 7, 31, 58). This kind of unilateral and uncoordinated punishment has been shown in
some behavioral economics experiments involving individuals playing public goods games in
a university laboratory setting (e.g. 20, but see also 3 for a different interpretation of these
experiments). However, once we move outside of the behavioral economics laboratory and
into field settings, evidence for individually-costly and uncoordinated punishment is rare
(see 27 for a review). Not only are rewards and punishments coordinated in modern states,
e.g. through a tax funded police force, but they are also coordinated in both small-scale
hunter-gatherer [5] and agricultural societies [49]. That is, rewards and punishments are
coordinated by self-created institutional rules.
The model below considers a situation in which individuals not only take part in a
collective action to generate resources for their group, but also take part in a political game
that determines how these resources are to be used. The model assumes an egalitarian
political game form in which the preference of each group member is weighted equally
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when creating the institutional rules. This type of political game form would have been
relevant during the hunter-gatherer period and the transition to agriculture. It also applies
to modern self-governing societies that form their economic rules without a coercive state
or elite imposing them. Examples include the governance of community irrigation systems,
fisheries, and forests studied by Ostrom [49].
In the model, group members decide how much of their resources to use as a productive
public good, for example to build and maintain an irrigation system, as opposed to how
much to use to incentivize cooperation through rewards and punishments. This makes
the evolution of the incentives to cooperate endogenous to the model. Consequently, this
type of model can be used both to examine the conditions under which groups can self-
organize to create incentives to cooperate, and to determine the balance between rewards
and punishments that is evolutionarily stable under different conditions.
The model is aimed at elucidating the selection pressure on institutional rules. It aims
to determine a set of sufficient conditions for the evolution of institutional rules that lead
to stable cooperation among self-interested individuals. Because the focus is on finding
sufficient conditions, the ecological environment has been deliberately kept simple. Similarly,
economic interactions are modeled using the standard public goods game from game theory,
allowing comparison with the vast body of literature on public goods games.
Model definition
The model presented here builds upon the model of the cultural evolution of sanctioning
institutions presented in [52]. The model considers a population of individuals that is sub-
divided into a finite number of groups, Ng, linked by migration. This spatial population
structure corresponds to Wright’s finite island model [72]. The lifecycle of individuals con-
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sists of discrete and non-overlapping generations, as follows. (1) Social interactions occur
between all individuals within each group, as detailed below. (2) Each individual has a
Poisson distributed number of offspring that survive to adulthood, with the mean of the
distribution being determined by the social interactions and resource abundance within its
group (defined explicitly below). (3) Adults of the previous generation perish. (4) Each
individual of the descendant generation either remains in its local group (with probability
1 −M) or disperses to a randomly chosen group (excluding its natal group).
Each individual i in group j carries three cultural traits that are passed from parent
to offspring subject to a per trait mutation rate µ. The first trait determines whether
individuals cooperate and produce B units of public good at a cost of C to themselves, or
whether they defect and produce no public good, and hence pay no cost. Mutation on this
trait involves changing to the other type. The second trait is a preference, hij (range [0,1]),
for the proportion of their group’s public good, hj , that should be used for production,
e.g. to maintain an irrigation system. This good is distributed between all group members
to increase their payoff, and is referred to as the productive public good. The remaining
proportion, 1 − hj , of the public good is then used to pay for institutional rewards and
punishments. How this is divided up between reward and punishment is determined by
the third trait that individuals carry, rij . Specifically, individuals have a preference for
what proportion, rj (range [0,1]), of the remaining public good should be used to reward
cooperators. The remainder (1−rj) is then invested into punishing defectors. Consequently,
the fraction of the total public good invested into punishing defectors is (1 − hj)(1 − rj),
and the fraction invested into rewarding cooperators is (1 − hj)rj . The traits hij and rij
thus represent individual preferences over outcomes of the political game, i.e. preferences
for hj and rj . Mutation on these traits changes the value according to a truncated normally
distributed random variable (with variance σ = 0.1), centered around the current trait value.
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The social interaction stage of the lifecycle is defined by a political game followed by an
economic game within the individual’s group. The number of cooperators in a group at time
t is written as ncj(t), and the number of defectors as ndj(t). The political game determines
hj , the proportion of group j’s public good that is used for production. It also determines rj ,
the proportion of the remaining public good that is used to reward cooperators as opposed
to punish defectors. The model assumes an egalitarian political game form in which each
group member’s preference is weighted equally. The values of hj and rj are thus set by taking
the mean of each group member’s preference (without regard to whether the individual is a
cooperator or a defector). This is then followed by the economic game, which is modeled as
a linear public goods game followed by rewards and punishments according to the values of
hj and rj .
Cooperators contribute to the public good, and may be rewarded for doing so, depending
upon the outcome of the political game. Defectors do not contribute, and may be punished
for this, again depending on the outcome of the political game. The outcome of the economic
game determines the maximal growth rate of cooperators and defectors in the group. This
can equivalently be thought of as the payoff from social/economic interactions. The maximal
growth rate of cooperators in group j at time t, ρcj(t), is then given by:
ρcj(t) = ρ0 − C + hj(t)ncj(t)B
ncj(t) + ndj(t)
+ E(1 − hj(t))rj(t)B. (1)
The constant E represents the efficiency of implementing the institutional rules, i.e. the
rate at which public good is converted into rewards or punishments. This would typically
be less than 1 due to various transaction costs [44], including the costs of negotiating and
bargaining over how the public good is to be used, and the costs of monitoring individuals
to determine whether they cooperate or defect [49]. The base growth rate, in the absence
of social interactions, is given by ρ0. The term E(1 − hj(t))rj(t)B represents the reward
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given to each cooperator, which is determined by the institutional rules decided by the group
members in the preceding political game. Note that the number of cooperators cancels out
of this term, because the marginal benefit of cooperation is assumed to be a constant that is
independent of the number of cooperators, i.e. cooperation brings constant returns to scale,
as in linear public goods games.
The maximal growth rate of defectors in group j at time t, ρdj(t), is given by:
ρdj(t) = ρ0 +
hj(t)ncj(t)B
ncj(t) + ndj(t)






represents the amount of punishment given to each
defector, again as decided by the outcome of the political game.














The fitness (expected number of offspring) of cooperators wc and defectors wd in group
j is then defined as:
wcj(t) =
ρcj(t)




1 + [ncj(t) + ndj(t)] /Kj(t)
. (5)
This follows a Beverton-Holt model of reproduction (e.g. 16), as commonly used in ecological
modeling where generations are discrete. It corresponds to a discrete time analogue of the
logistic growth equation. The actual number of offspring produced by each individual is
given by sampling from a Poisson distribution with the fitness of the individual as the mean
of the distribution.
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The variable Kj(t) can be thought of as the “carrying capacity” of the group (more
precisely, it is a dynamic variable representing the intensity of local density-dependent com-
petition within the group, and is proportional to the carrying capacity as defined in standard
ecology models). Its value is determined by a type of hard selection process in which the
carrying capacity of a group depends upon the mean growth rate (payoff) of its members
(both cooperators and defectors), relative to the mean growth rate in the population as a





In contrast to some forms of hard selection, the total population carrying capacity (the
sum of all group carrying capacities) is kept fixed to its value at the beginning of the first







This represents cases in which there is a finite amount of resource available for the whole
population, and consequently one group’s growth is another group’s loss.
While the model is framed here in terms of biological fitness, the vertical transmission
and fitness proportionate selection used corresponds to payoff-biased social learning, where
individuals imitate traits in proportion to the payoff their bearers receive relative to the
mean payoff in the population [14].
The model defines a stochastic process for the state variables ncj(t), ndj(t), hj(t), and
rj(t) in each group j of the spatially-structured population. These variables allow us to
evaluate the average frequency of cooperators and defectors, and the average values of hij
and rij in the population. Due to the strong non-linearity of the model, the analysis proceeds
by means of individual-based simulations. The baseline parameters used for the simulations,
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unless otherwise specified, are given in Table 1. Because the simulation model is stochastic
and contains no absorbing states, it represents an ergodic Markov chain in which every state
will eventually be visited through mutation. As such, we are interested in the stationary
distribution, i.e. what proportion of time the simulation spends in each state. Consequently,
the analysis focuses on the long-run time-average values of cooperation, hij , and rij , which
do not depend upon initial conditions provided that the simulation is run for a sufficient
length of time. This is in contrast to the multiple replicates that would have to be done in
simulations with absorbing states.
Results
As a baseline we can consider first the case of a well-mixed population consisting of a single
group. Starting the analysis with a well-mixed population allows us to determine the role
that group structure plays in the evolutionary dynamics. Figure 2 shows the resulting
co-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and the outcome of the political game (rewards
and punishments). Cooperation is stable when there is sufficient investment of a group’s
resources into rewards and punishments, such that the cost of cooperating is more than
offset by rewards to cooperators, and the punishments received by defectors. However,
individual preferences over outcomes of the political game, hij and rij , are not themselves
under selection in a well-mixed population. This is because the only effect that hij and
rij have on individual fitness is through their effects on the outcome of the political game,
i.e. hj and rj . But if the population only consists of a single group then hj and rj are the
same for every member of the population. Consequently, the individual preferences hij and
rij cannot be a source of differential fitness, because they do not differentially affect the
bearer. As a result they change entirely through drift, i.e. random sampling. When hj by
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chance becomes too large then cooperation breaks down because of insufficient investment
into rewards and punishments.
In comparison, Figure 3 illustrates the co-evolutionary dynamics when there are Ng =
50 groups connected by migration. The key result is that individual preferences over the
outcome of the political game are now under selection. Specifically hij , the individual
preferences for the proportion of resources to be used as a productive public good as opposed
to for rewards and punishments, is selected to become close to 1. This is due to the hard
selection process, in which the carrying capacity of a group depends on the mean growth rate
of its members compared to the population average. Groups that obtain a larger carrying
capacity will then send out a larger number of migrants, thereby spreading the institutional
preferences of their members throughout the population. Hard selection in a structured
population thus creates competition between institutions [52].
However, cooperation is not stable because individuals evolve to invest as much of their
resources as possible into the productive public good, at the expense of the rewards and
punishments that are necessary to maintain it. This is the “tragedy of the political game”.
It is largely analogous to the second-order free-rider problem in traditional models of pun-
ishment [22]. Here it arises because cooperative individuals receive an immediate benefit
from the productive public good. By contrast the benefits of punishing defectors only arise
if there are a sufficient number of defectors present. The benefits of rewards are also lower
than that of the productive public good (E < 1), so the productive public good is also
preferred to rewards. Thus, although individuals could play the political game in such a
way that cooperation would be stable through rewards and punishments, they are tempted
not to because of the immediate benefits of investing in the productive public good instead,
even though this ultimately leads to the loss of cooperation.
26
Figure 4 shows the long-run time-average values of cooperation, hij and rij , and their
sensitivity to model parameters, when the stationary distribution is approximated by run-
ning the simulations for 3× 106 generations. These results also show that where individuals
can choose their own system of rewards and punishments, they prefer rewards to punish-
ments. This occurs even though punishment of defectors is more efficient when cooperation
is common [15]. Punishment is more efficient in this case because each unit of investment
only has to be shared amongst defectors to penalize them, whereas each unit of investment
into rewards will have to be shared with nearly the entire group. Punishment could therefore
allow cooperation to be maintained under larger hj values. However, because rewards bring
an immediate benefit to cooperators, evolution goes in this direction rather than towards
efficiency.
How can the stability of institutional rewards and punishments be increased, and the
tragedy of the political game be averted? To investigate this, we can consider an alterna-
tive form of hard selection in which the productive public good directly increases carrying
capacity. This would be the case with irrigation farming, for example [30]. The increase
in carrying capacity must ultimately be limited by other factors, though, such as space.
This means that investment into the productive public good now experiences diminishing
marginal returns. This can be modeled using the following function in place of Equation 7
[52]:
Kj(t) = G+ β [1 − exp (−γhj(t)ncj(t)B)] , (8)
where β is a parameter controlling the saturation point, i.e. the maximum possible increase
in carrying capacity from investment into the productive good. The parameter γ sets the
gradient, i.e. how quickly the saturation point is reached. The growth rate / payoff functions
of cooperators and defectors (Equations 1 and 2) are replaced with the following (since the
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productive public good has been moved from the growth rate to the carrying capacity terms):
ρcj(t) = ρ0 − C + E(1 − hj(t))rj(t)B, (9)
ρdj(t) = ρ0 − E(1 − hj(t))(1 − rj(t))ncj(t)B
ndj(t)
. (10)
Figure 5 shows the results of using this model with β = 300 and γ = 0.0075. In this case
the tragedy no longer occurs – individuals do not evolve to invest all of their resources into the
productive public good. Rather, rewards and punishments are maintained and cooperation
remains stable. Diminishing returns mean that the selection pressure on increasing hj also
diminishes as hj becomes large. Consequently, the tragedy of the political game is averted.
In reality, all pubic goods must ultimately undergo diminishing marginal returns [21, 54],
implying that the tragedy is not likely to occur in many situations. Finally, individuals
again evolve to prefer rewarding to punishment.
Discussion
Institutions can be defined as political game forms that generate the rules, and hence incen-
tives, for economic interactions [34]. Taking this view allows us to produce dynamic models
of institutional evolution. When combined with historical evidence on the types of political
game forms and institutional rules that different societies had (e.g. 26), this allows us to
explore why some groups have managed to create institutional rules that foster coopera-
tion, and why others have failed [1]. Applications to this include understanding the rise of
hierarchy and states, and addressing pressing public goods problems such as climate change.
Cultural group selection models have traditionally viewed institutions as equilibria. These
models suggest that institutional rules change by a discontinuous and punctuated process
of random drift and between-group competition. However, individuals should be expected
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to try to craft institutional rules that benefit themselves. This means that institutional
rules can also change as a result of within-group processes, often on much faster timescales
and without the need for catastrophic events occurring at the group level. The simulation
model presented here demonstrates that the institutional rules which support cooperation
can evolve among self-interested individuals, without the need for conformity- or prestige-
biased social learning to suppress competition within groups.
The model also demonstrates the importance of modeling the dynamics of rule forma-
tion. Previous work has shown that the most efficient strategy for promoting cooperation
should be to switch from institutional rewards to punishments once cooperation becomes
common [15]. However, evolution of individual preferences for the rules does not lead to
this efficient strategy. Rather, individuals evolve to prefer rewarding to punishment even
when cooperation is common (Figures 4 and 5). This is because in contrast to punishment,
cooperators still receive some small benefit from rewards even when there are no defectors
present.
Future work should model political game forms in more detail. There is a need for
more realistic models of the bargaining and negotiation processes that go on within groups
to generate institutional rules. How can we best model the bargaining process between
individuals with different preferences for institutional rules? The processes by which political
game forms themselves change also need to be modeled. When are political game forms
likely to move between egalitarianism and despotism, as happened, for example, with the
transition from a hunter-gatherer to agricultural lifestyle 10 000 years ago?
In summary, a framework for modeling institutional evolution has been presented here.
An application of the framework was illustrated using a simple model of the co-evolution
of individual social behaviors, with individual preferences for whether groups should reward
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cooperators, or punish defectors. The political game form was modeled as an egalitarian
process in which the preferences of all group members were aggregated. Previous work
suggests that the results will be qualitatively similar if the institutional rules are set by a
single individual, i.e. a leader, provided that the leader receives the same amount of the
public good as other group members [52]. However, future work should investigate how the
rules would change if leaders take a disproportionate share of the public good, as happened
after the origin of agriculture.
In conclusion, it is intended that this framework will allow Artificial Life researchers to
address how groups can self-organize to create conditions that support cooperation.
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Figure captions
Figure 1: An institution is represented by a political game form, which determines the
rules for subsequent economic interactions.
Figure 2: Dynamics of the co-evolution of cooperation, with institutionally-coordinated
investment into rewards and punishments, in a well-mixed population consisting of a single
group. Although cooperation can evolve when the political game results in sufficient in-
vestment into rewards and punishments, this outcome is not maintained because individual
preferences over the outcome of the political game (hij and rij) are not under selection in a
well-mixed population. Parameters: E = 0.75, G = 20,M = 0, Ng = 1.
Figure 3: Co-evolutionary dynamics in a structured population undergoing hard selection
(see text). Hard selection favours groups with the largest mean growth rate. Consequently,
individuals are selected to have preferences over the political game that increase invest-
ment into productive public goods as much as possible. This leads to a tragedy in which
h-preferences tend to become too large, leading to the loss of investment into rewards and
punishments and the collapse of cooperation. Parameters: E = 0.75, G = 20,M = 0.1.
Figure 4: Sensitivity to model parameters. Results show time averages over 3 × 106 gen-
erations. (a) Cooperation requires a sufficient institutional efficiency in rewards and pun-
ishments, E. Parameters: G = 20,M = 0.1. (b) Larger migration rates between groups
increase the effects of hard selection, exacerbating the tragedy of the political game. Pa-
rameters: G = 20, E = 0.75. (c) Increasing group size from 10 to 100 decreases cooperation,
partly because investment into cooperation, rewards, and punishments are split between
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more individuals. Parameters: E = 0.75,M = 0.1.
Figure 5: A version of the model in which investment into the public good directly increases
carrying capacity, relaxing the constraint on total population size (see text). Because of the
ecological constraint that carrying capacity cannot increase indefinitely, this introduces di-
minishing returns into the benefits of public goods production. In this case individuals do
not overly invest into productive public goods, and tragedy of the political game is averted.
(a) Co-evolutionary dynamics. Parameters: E = 0.75, G = 20,M = 0.1. (b) Sensitivity to
the efficiency of institutional rewards and punishments (time averages over 1 × 106 genera-
tions). Parameters: G = 20,M = 0.1. (c) Sensitivity to the migration rate (time averages
over 1× 106 generations): the tragedy is now averted even for large migration rate. Param-
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Table 1: Baseline parameter settings.
Parameter Value
Benefit of cooperating, B 0.9
Cost of cooperating, C 0.1
Base growth rate, ρ0 2
Mutation rate, µ 0.001
Variance of normal distribution used for mutations on h- and r-traits, σ 0.1
Number of groups, Ng 50
